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Using an extensive longitudinal dataset extracted from the Norwegian Prescription Database 
(NorPD) containing all prescriptions written in the period January 2004 to June 2007, we 
selected two particular drugs (chemical substances) used against cholesterol. The two brand-
name products on the Norwegian markets were Provachol (atc code C10AA03) and Zocor 
(atc code C10AA01). The generics are Provastatine and Simastatine. The model accounts for 
taste persistence and is estimated on panel data. We find that prices have a negative impact on 
transitions in the sense that an increase in the brand price will reduce the transition from 
generics to brand and likewise an increase in the generic price will reduce the transition from 
brand to generics. 
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1. Introduction  
In Dalen et al (2010) we estimated the choice between brand-name and generic drugs 
based on cross-section data. We extracted the entire population of prescriptions in 
February 2004 and 2006 on 23 different chemical substances. In February 2004 we had 
102 201 observations and in February 2006 we had 210 877 observations. The 
observations gave us the choice of brand or generics among these patients in these two 
cross-sections. From the estimated model we derived price elasticities which were the 
elasticities of the brand products with respect to the brand price. The average of these 
elasticities was -0.36 in 2004. 
 
In the present paper we exploit the longitudinal dimension of the data and estimate a 
dynamic model on monthly observations from May 2004 until June 2007 of drug choices 
for 109 patients in Norway. From the model we derive transition probabilities that give 
the transition from brand-name drug to generics and vice versa. We selected only one 
drug; a drug used against cholesterol. The two brand-name products on the Norwegian 
markets for statines in the period May 2004 to June 2007 were Provachol (atc code 
C10AA03) and Zocor (atc code C10AA01). The generics are Provastatine and 
Simastatine. From the model we derived elasticities of the probabilities of shifting from 
brand to generics with respect to the price of generics and of the probabilities of shifting 
from generics to brand with respect to the brand price. The average of the elasticities over 
patients and periods were -0.27 and -0.46 respectively which are not that different from 
the estimates of the price elasticity derived from the cross-section estimates referred to 
above which also covered not only statines but 22 other substances. 
 
In addition to the expected price effects we found that the older a male doctor is the more 
likely it is that he continues to prescribe the brand-name product. The dynamic model 
allows for taste persistence and the correlation of is calculated across patients and across 
time. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 gives the data, 
estimates are given in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes. 3 
 
   
 
2. The model 
 
The model we employ is based on a dynamic choice model developed by Dagsvik 
(2002). Let Unj(t) denote the utility of patient n of using drug j at time t. j= B(brand-
name), G(generics). Let Bnt be the choice set. We will assume that   nj nt U( t ) , j B  is a 
random utility process. Let   nj nj v( t ) ( t )  be the period-specific utility in contrast to 
Unj(t) which are utilities that account for “taste-persistence”.  The  nj(t)  are assumed to be 
independent of vnj(t) and they are assumed to be iid extreme value distributed, that is  
nj Pr( (t) x) exp( exp(x)).     
 
The model extends the common logit model to deal with correlation in preferences or 
rather taste persistence. It should be noted that this is not the same as state dependence. 
With the latter the choice you have made in the past has a direct impact on the current 
choices. This is not the case here; the assumption is simply that preferences may be 
correlated.  In Dagsvik (2002) it is shown that 
  
(1)  nj nj nj nj U( t ) m a x ( U( t1 ) , v( t ) ( t ) )       
    
The coefficient θ may be interpreted as a preference discount factor:  
 
If θ=0 there is a complete strong taste persistence, and if θ=∞ there is no taste persistence 
at all and nj nj nj U( t ) v( t ) ( t )   . 
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To calculate correlation across utilities it is convenient to calculate correlation of a 
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We observe that if covariates are constant over time the correlation from t to t-1 is 
approximately equal to e
-θ.   
   
As shown in Dagsvik (2002) the model can be employed to yield transition probabilities, 
which in our case will be between brand-name products and generics. Thus the transition 
probabilities are the following: 
 
QnBGt = probability that patient n transit from Brand-name drug in period t-1 to Generics 
in period t 
QnBBt = probability that patient n stay on Brand-name drug in period t-1 and in period t 
QnBBt= 1-QnBGt  
 
QnGBt= probability that patient n transit from Generics in period t-1 to Brand-name drug 
in period t 
QnGGt= probability that patient n stay on Generic in period t-1 and in period t 
QnGGt= 1-QnGBt. 
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The deterministic part of the utility function, vjnt, j=B,G is assumed to depend linearly on 
the price of the drug, age and gender of patient.  Because of the loyalty among patients 
and doctors we expect that n will have a low value indicating strong taste persistence. n 
may depend on characteristics such as age and gender of doctors and patients. However, 
here we assume it to be a constant. 
 
t0=date of entry of the drug to the market. Because the data we use are detailed register 
data that started in January 2004, t0 is set equal to this date.  
 
The model is estimated by a standard maximum likelihood procedure. The likelihood is:  
 
(9)  nt nt nt nt y1 y z1 z
BGnt BGnt GBnt GBnt
nt
LQ ( 1 Q ) Q ( 1 Q )
     
























We assume that the deterministic part of the utility function depends on the price of the 
drug, and the interaction between age and gender of both patient and doctor. We expect 
that price has a negative impact on demand. Furthermore we expect that male patient, in 
particular when they are getting older are less likely to make generic substitution, and 
that the describing doctor is less likely to accept generic substitution if they are males, in 
particular when they are getting older. Thus we assume: 
 
(12)  1n G t nGt G P v    
    












The prices may vary across time and patients. It should be noted, however, that for all 
individuals social security cover part of the expenses on statines. This is accounted for in 
the paper. 
 
From the structure of the model we easily see that we can only identify  .  BG    
Our expectation with respect to the sign of the coefficients are β1<0,  β2>0,  β3>0. 
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3. The data  
Our data were extracted from the Norwegian Prescription Database (NorPD) at the 
Norwegian Institute of Public Health. The NorPD (Norwegian title: Reseptregisteret) was 
established on 1st January 2004.
2 The Database monitors all drugs that are dispensed by 
prescription in Norway, and provides information about the patient (age, sex, and 
insurance status), the physician (age, sex, and speciality), the pharmacy (location), and 
the dispensed drug (price, package size, strength, product name). Using other sources of 
information provided by the Norwegian Medicines Control Authority (list of pharmacies 
and a list of drugs approved for the Norwegian market), we get additional information 
about pharmacy ownership, identity of the main wholesaler and producer name and price 
of the drugs. The latter is used to identify brand-name drugs and generics. 
 
In the data set only the price of the drug chosen (p_dd) is reported that may be brand or 
generic. To generate the price of the drug not chosen (p_not)  we have done as follows. 
First we generated a dummy variable (b_chosen) that identify if the drug is brand or 
generic. It is equal to one if the drug name is Pravachol or Zocor (alone or in 
combination); atc_code is C10AA03 or C10AA001, 0 otherwise. Then, we generated the 
                                                 
2 See Furu (2001) 8 
 
mean price (p_ddd) over the chosen drug that has same atc_code, same strength   
(strength), same pharmacy identifier (id_n_ph) and same date of transaction (months). At 
last we generated the alternative price (p_not) equal to the mean price just computed, 
conditioned on b (1 or 0). It happens that there are groups in which only brand is chosen 
or only generic is chosen. In these cases we could not compute the alternative price and 
we then set p_not  equal to missing. It also happens that in some groups there is just only 
one observation useful to compute the average. Also in this case we set the value of p_not 
to missing. To sum up:  
 
p_generic = p_ddd*(1-b_choicen) + p_not*b_choicen; 
p_brand =   p_ddd*b_choicen + p_not*(1-b_choicen); 
where: p_generic is the price of the generic drug; p_brand is the price of the brand drug, 
p_ddd is the price of the chosen drug and p_not is the price of the drug not chosen, and 
b_choice is  a dummy variable equal to 1 if brand is chosen and 0 otherwise. 
 
In the sample there are at least 28 prescriptions by patients over the 37 months. We 
observe drug prescriptions from May 2004 (first prescription considered) to June 2007 
(month 5 to 42), a total of 37 months. 
 
After the selections listed above, we get 3898 observations that refer to 109 patients. 
The panel is unbalanced since for each patient there are a different number of 
prescriptions from May 2004 to June 2007.  
 
The following statistics, show that at minimum a patient has 28 prescriptions, and at 
maximum 52 prescriptions.  
 
Table 1. Number of prescriptions, May 2004-June 2007, statines 
Number of 
patients 
Mean no of 
prescriptions 
Std.Dev Min  Max 
109 35,76  6.33  28  52 
 
 
The number of prescriptions by patient is not equal to the number of months since there 






Table 2 gives the description of the variable while Table 3 gives the descriptive statistics. 
 
Table 2  Description of the variables 
Variable Description 
p_ddd 
price (in NOK) per daily dose (i.e. 
p_ddd =  no_packages * p_packages/no_ddd ) 
p_not  price of not chosen 
b 
Dummy: b = 1 if  brand (drug_name is equal to 
"Pravachol"  and  atc_code is equal to 
"C10AA03" or drug_name is equal to "Zocor"  
and  atc_code is equal to "C10AA01"), b = 0 if 
generic (i.e. Pravastatin and Simvastatin) 
p_generic  Price per daily dose of generic drug 
p_brand  Price per daily dose of brand drug  
age_d  Age of the doctor 
age_p  Age of the patient 
patient_m  Dummy: 1 if male, 0 otherwise 
patient_f  Dummy: 1 if female, 0 otherwise 
doctor_m  Dummy: 1 if male, 0 otherwise 
doctor_f  Dummy: 1 if female, 0 otherwise 
months  months of drug prescription ranges from 5 (May 2004) 
to 42 (June 2007)
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics   (number of observations 3898 – 109 patients) 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
p_ddd 2.7184 1.9349 0.5679 9.7388 
p_not 3.6193 2.1647 0.8693 9.6857 
b 0.1637 0.3700 0.0000 1.0000 
p_generic 2.3705 1.1450 0.5679 7.0850 
p_brand 3.9671 2.5000 0.8694 9.7388 
age_d 50.5872 9.3071 29.0000 68.0000 
age_p 78.4254 8.6641 50.0000 91.0000 
doctor_f 0.1329 0.3395 0.0000 1.0000 
doctor_m 0.8671 0.3395 0.0000 1.0000 
patient_f 0.4115 0.4922 0.0000 1.0000 
patient_m 0.5885 0.4922 0.0000 1.0000 





4. Results  
Table 4 gives the estimates. We observe that price has the expected negative impact on 
demand and the impact is significant different from zero. The interaction of male doctors 
and age has a positive and significant impact on the use of brand products. Patient’s age 
interacted with gender has no significant impact 
 
The preference discount factor is positive and significant which indicates that preferences 
are correlated over time, given the covariates in the deterministic part of the utility 
function. 
  
Table 4. Estimates. 
 
Variables Parameters  Estimates  t-values 
Constant  α 3.2152  15.337 
Price  β1  -1.1913 -2.841 
Patient age x Male  β2  -0.0373 -0.965 
Doctor age x Male  β 3  0.2096 3.967 
Preference discount factor  θ 3.7475  4.249 
No of observations  3898  (109 patients) 
Mean log-likelihood  - 433.126 
Correlation matrix of the estimated parameters 
    α             β1                  β2                    β 3                   θ 
 α 1.000  -0.454  -0.003  -0.118   0.572 
 β1 -0.454   1.000  -0.279  -0.228   0.123 
 β2 -0.003  -0.279   1.000  -0.352  -0.048 
 β 3  -0.118  -0.228  -0.352   1.000  -0.029 
 θ  0.572   0.123  -0.048  -0.029   1.000 
 
From Table 5 we observe that all elasticites have the expected sign, which of course 
come the fact that β1<0. The only two sizeable elasticities are the most important ones. 
The elasticity of transiting from brand to generics (statines) with respect to the generic 
price is on average equal to -0.2732. The elasticity of transiting from generics to brand 
(statines) with respect to the brand price is on average equal to -0.4625. The brand price 
has thus a stronger impact on the the transition than the generic price. In Figur 1 we show 
how the elasticities vary across the 37 months. We observe that the two most important 
elesticities referred to above indicate that price responses were strongest at the beginning 
of the period (May 2004) and at around month 20 (January 2006) 11 
 
Table 5. Elastisites of the transition probabilites with respect to prices; averaged over 
patients and periods. 
a)  for transition from brand to generic as a consequence of an increase in generic drug price (see eq14 a) 
b)  from brand to brand as a consequence of an increase in  generic drug price (see eq. 14 b) 
c)  for transition from brand to generic as a consequence of an increase  in  brand drug price (see eq. 14 c) 
d)  from brand to brand as a consequence of an increase in  brand drug price (see eq. 14 d) 
e)  for transition from generic to brand as a consequence of an increase in generic drug price (see eq 14 e) 
f)  from generic to generic as a consequence of an increase in generic drug price (see eq. 14 f) 
g)  for transition from generic to brand as a consequence of an increase in  brand drug price (see eq. 14 g) 
h)  from generic to generic as a consequence of an increase in brand drug price increase (see eq. 14 h) 
 
Variables Mean Min Max Std. 
eq. 14 a)  ElQBGnt:_PG -0.2732 -0.8416 -0.0658 0.1293 
eq.14 b)  ElQBBnt:_ PG 0.0092 0.0006 0.1189 0.0111 
eq 14 c)   ElQBGnt:_PB 0.0101 0.0006 0.1405 0.0142 
eq 14 d)   ElQBBnt:_PB -0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0001 0.0002 
      
eq 14 e)   ElQGBnt:_PG 0.0092 0.0006 0.1189 0.0111 
eq 14 f)   ElQGGnt:_PG -0.0002 -0.0006 0.0000 0.0001 
eq 14 g)   ElQGBnt:_PB -0.4625 -1.1406 -0.1011 0.2878 










Figure 1.Mean elasticity of probability vs. month 
a)  for transition from brand to generic as a consequence of an increase in generic drug price (see eq. 
14a) 
b)  from brand to brand as a consequence of an increase in  generic drug price (see eq. 14 b) 
c)  for transition from brand to generic as a consequence of an increase  in  brand drug price (see eq. 
14 c) 
d)  from brand to brand as a consequence of an increase in  brand drug price (see eq. 14 d) 
e)  for transition from generic to brand as a consequence of an increase in generic drug price (see eq. 
14e) 
f)  from generic to generic as a consequence of an increase in generic drug price (see eq. 14 f) 
g)  for transition from generic to brand as a consequence of an increase in  brand drug price (see eq. 
14 g) 







































































































































































































































































In Table 6 we report the mean of the correlation of utilites across patients (and time). 
When the drug type is the same, the correlation is mainly due to the coefficient θ, the 
preference discount factor. When the drug types are different (B and G) the correlation is 
also affected by the fact that the characteristics of the different drug types differ. Figure 2 
gives the variation across all 109 patients. Table 7 report the same correlation across time 
and Figure 3 show how these correlations varied over the 37 months. 
 
Table 6. Mean correlation of utilities for the 109 patients.  
     
nj ni corr(exp( U (t 1)),exp( U (t)  
   Mean Std. Dev. Min  Max
j=B, i=B  0.023352 0.0007092 0.0222853  0.0260270
j=G,, i=G  0.023417 0.0007232 0.0219913  0.0260024
j=B, i=G_  0.277621 0.1257965 0.1303722  0.8622116




Figure 2.  Mean correlation of utilities: (a) mean correlation of transition from 
brand to brand (b) mean correlation of transition from generic to generic, (c) mean 










































































































































Table 7. Mean correlation of utilities across time   
nj ni corr(exp( U (t 1)),exp( U (t)))   Mean Std. Dev. Min  Max
j=B, i=B  0.0218287 0.0034909 0.0117883  0.0252339
j=G,, i=G  0.0219159 0.0033689 0.0117883  0.0253417
j=B, i=G_  0.2536082 0.0523233 0.094179  0.3145396







Figure 3. Mean correlation of utilities across time: (a) mean correlation of transition 
from brand to brand (b) mean correlation of transition from generic to generic, (c) 


































































































































Using an extensive longitudinal dataset extracted from the Norwegian Prescription Database 
(NorPD) containing all prescriptions written in the period January 2004 to June 2007, we selected 
two particular drugs (chemical substances) used against cholesterol. The two brand-name 
products on the Norwegian markets were Provachol (atc code C10AA03) and Zocor (atc code 
C10AA01). The generics are Provastatine and Simastatine. The model accounts for taste 
persistence and is estimated on panel data. We find that prices have a negative impact on 
transitions in the sense that an increase in the brand price will reduce the transition from generics 
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